“What’s in the Name? Russian Understanding of Patriotism”

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Abstract

This paper is based on a project of the Institute of Modern Russia (IMR) that explores the ways Russians from diverse backgrounds understand and relate to the concept of patriotism. The significance of this study is primarily tied to "insertion" of patriotism into virtually all areas of social life in Russia and its assumption as an "ideological posture shared by all parties." In today's Russia, those "who refuse to present themselves as 'patriots' are delegitimized and ushered off the public stage" (Laruelle, 2009). Another point that needs to be taken into consideration is that this project has been undertaken at a time when the lines between Russian patriotism and the "negative features of nationalism" may seem to become increasingly blurred. Currently, as the results of some studies indicate, among the principal ideas that consolidate different parts of Russian society are xenophobia and general intolerance to "others." Within this context, the present project seeks to identify and illuminate the multiplicity of dimensions in which Russian patriotism may manifest. As part of the project, IMR partnered with the Levada Center, a Russian independent polling center, to conduct a survey on patriotism in Russia.

Introduction and Background

A quarter of a century ago, in his influential essay "The End of History?" (1989) Francis Fukuyama wrote about "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." The euphoria about democracy's gains and future, however, was short-lived with the realization that even the countries that initially celebrated successful democratic transition may be incapable of withstanding autocratic rollbacks. By moving further away from the ideology of liberal democracy, Russia has been in search for an alternative - a value system that would serve as a basis for a consolidation of Russian society.

According to one commentator, while rejecting the slogans "For the Motherland! For Stalin!", objectively, Russia cannot return to the triad 'Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Narodnost.' At the same time, it is not customary in our country to die for the values of the Constitution, Republic, Democracy, for the Human Rights and Civil Society" (Bartsits, 2014, p. 6). Since the early 2000s, patriotism has been advanced by Russian policy-makers as a solution that would allow to fill the ideological gap and restore and promote national pride.

The words "patriot" and "patriotism," borrowed from the French *patriote* ("a fellow countryman"), came into the Russian language during the time of Peter the Great, the Russian Tsar, called by some a "true patriot" who became "the father of his old, and the creator of a new fatherland" (Viroli, 1995, p. 114). In the Russian (as well as in the English) language, "patriotism" typically has had a positive connotation. As Nathanson (1993) argued,

> Most people think of patriotism as a trait that is valuable and worth encouraging. Indeed, patriotism is something that most citizens of a country expect of one another. They expect other citizens to care about and support the country and assume that patriotism is a virtue. It is no accident that patriotism is generally viewed in a positive light. (p. 3)

MacIntyre (1984) described patriotism as one of "loyalty-exhibiting virtues" and placed it on the same level as love of the family, marital fidelity, friendship and so forth. In a related vein, Viroli (1995) maintained that patriotism was "morally mandatory":

> We have a moral obligation towards our country because we are indebted to it. We owe our country our life, our education, our language, and, in the most fortunate cases, our liberty. If we want to be moral persons, we must return what we have received, at least in part, by serving the common good. (p. 9)

The core definition of the word "patriotism" is "love to the country," though the concept is much more complex than that. The actions of an individual (or readiness for action for the sake of one's country) are often said to be patriotism's most significant quality (Ivanova, 2013). Patriotism "assesses the degree of love for and pride in one's nation" and involves a feeling of "organic belongingness" to the fatherland, a particular community, and the people (Bar-Tal, 1993; Shapovalov, 2008). It is about "attachment to national values based on critical understanding," caring about an individual, human dignity, about trying to enhance the well-being and prosperity (Adorno et al, 1950; Shapovalov, 2008). "Genuine" patriotism is

"unconditional – irrespective of the ruling regime, practiced policy, dominant ideology or values emphasized. The attachment is not dependent on these and other factors which are often temporary" (Bar-Tal, 1993, p. 49)

The "true" or "genuine" patriotism is often contrasted with "false" or "pseudo"-patriotism." The latter is defined by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) as a "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (p. 107). According to Smith (2013), the patriotic sentiments may serve to strengthen social bonds among citizens and provide "an incubator in which trust and compassion can grow." Patriotism establishes a "we" relationship and attitudes, a sense of connectedness and oneness.

Importantly, however, patriotism can become a force "for good and for evil" (Bader, 2006). For instance, the concept of patriotism can be monopolized by a certain group in order to advance a particular agenda. One of the arguments on which Leo Tolstoy's famous critique of patriotism is based is that "[p]atriotism … is nothing else but a means of obtaining for the rulers their ambitions and covetous desires" (as quoted in Nathanson, 1993). Monopolization of patriotism may lead to "elimination of complexity and ambiguity" from the discourse by "immunizing" from examination particular fundamental issues (Johnston, 2007). In such an environment, "rational criticism" may be "ruled out" (MacIntyre (1984).

Furthermore, a number of commentators have posed an important (and, unfortunately, often neglected) question of whether it is possible to be "pro-us" without being "anti-them." A related question would be whether it is possible to promote patriotism and tolerance (including, but not limited to, ethnic tolerance) simultaneously. The potential danger associated with patriotism is that it may degenerate into the "negative features of nationalism" such as intolerance and xenophobia (Taras, 2008). Indeed, in certain situations, "When we search for 'ours' … we imply 'not ours' and the search for the enemy of the people begins" ("V poiskah smysla. Novyi patriotism," 2006).

These questions and concerns are not new and their examination may bring observers back to the very notion of patriotism. A reading of the classics of the 19th century Russian literature may be an interesting starting point. In his book *The Justification of the Good* (1897), Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov strongly argued against national hostility, which, in his view, is incompatible with the notion of "true patriotism":

> How … can a true patriot, for the sake of a supposed 'advantage' to his nation, destroy its solidarity with other nations, and despise or hate foreigners? A nation finds its true good in the common good; how then can a patriot take the good of his nation to be something distinct from and opposed to everything else? (Solovyov, 2010, p. 296)

Reinforcing his idealistic stance, Solovyov maintained: "we must love all nations as we love our own." According to Solovyov, "This commandment affirms patriotism as a natural and fundamental feeling, as a direct duty of the individual to the collective whole immediately above him" (p. 297). Similarly, Fyodor Dostoevsky in his famous speech on Pushkin (1880) stated: "Yes, beyond all doubt, the destiny of a Russian is pan-European and universal. To become a

true Russian, to become a Russian fully (in the end of all, I repeat), means only to become the brother of all men, to become, if you will, a universal man."

Nikolai Dobrolyubov (1948), whose view is sometimes considered as one reflecting "the ideal of Russian national identity" (Levashov, 2006), argued that "true patriotism being a particular expression of love for mankind, may not co-exist with unfriendliness towards other nationalities" (p. 564). Dobrolyubov considered patriotism as a very personal, unconscious feeling.

The period, when Dobrolyubov produced his *Readings in Russian Civilization*, saw the official "Russian idea" as "practically identified with patriotism" (Yanov, 2013). At that time, the ideology of patriotism or "state patriotism" was "aimed at consolidating power." In 2000s, patriotism has been considered as a "consolidating basis for Russia's politics."

Russia's State Patriotism in the Making

In December 1999, in his programmatic article "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium," the future president Vladimir Putin emphasized the importance of "the traditional values of Russians," including those of patriotism, statism, and social solidarity. He stressed that Russia "was and will remain a great power" and that "[i]t will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of … the US or Britain in which liberal values have deep historic traditions" (Putin, 1999).

Following the president's lead, Russian authorities took a number of steps to reinforce patriotism in the country. Among the first initiatives was the development and introduction of the state patriotic education program – The State Program for Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens, 2001 – 2005.[1] The main coordinator and developer of the Program was the Russian State Military Historical-Cultural Center (Rosvoentsentr).

The importance of launching a program of patriotic education is largely explained by the authors of the Program within the context of the "events" that previously occurred in Russia (although not specified in the Program, one may easily guess that the authors meant those related to the period from 1985 to 1999). According to this line of argument, in Russian official discourse, the negative state of affairs with patriotism and patriotic education was attributed to:

- deheroisation of Russian history;
- humiliation of Russia national dignity;
- prioritizing universal human values over national values;
- neglect of military training; and
- deideologization of the Russian youth (Rapoport, 2009).

The Program suggests that the task of advancing patriotic education as the foundation for consolidating society and strengthening the state is a matter of particular urgency. The State is expected to serve as a key institution to ensure the arrangement and functioning of the whole

[1] The Concept for Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens (2003), as well as new state programs for the years 2006-2010 and 2011-2015, which were adopted in the following years, continued the programmatic approach to patriotic education in Russia.

system of patriotic education. In 2002, as part of the State Program, by the decision of the Russian Ministry of Education, a new government entity was created – the Russian Center for the Civic and Patriotic Education of Children and Youth, the mission of which was to "form [in citizens] heightened patriotic consciousness, the feelings of love and devotion to the Motherland, readiness to perform their civic duty and constitutional obligations to defend the interests of their country" (http://rospatriotcentr.ru/about-center/).

Discussing the initiatives launched by the Russian government in the early 2000s, Blum (2006) emphasized a clearly state-centric nature of the patriotic education programs. Additionally, the implementation of the programs was to be based on coordinated efforts of numerous actors at the federal, regional, and local levels and aimed at the representatives of "all social and age groups."As Blum argued, the top-down approaches coupled with mechanisms of state oversight were expected to ensure for "the great power" (Russia) "consistency and uniformity in propaganda work, in order to counter the "anti-patriotic" attitudes allegedly appearing in the "liberal-dominated" mass media" (p. 3).

Within a comparatively short period of time, patriotism that came to be "understood as an integral part of the emergence of a cohesive and self-confident Russia," became the ideological posture shared by all parties" (Laruelle, 2009, p. 25). A new elite of "patriotic managers" (Horvath, 2012) - that has included politicians, academics, journalists, and entrepreneurs - emerged in Russian society. Within that context, those "who refuse[d] to present themselves as 'patriots' [were] delegitimated and ushered off the public stage" (Laruelle, 2009).

The issue of patriotism reemerged with a new force during Vladimir Putin's first year back in office as president (2012). In an article "Putin, in Need of Cohesion, Pushes Patriotism," The New York Times wrote, "[A]fter a wave of unsettling street protests, Mr. Putin needs an ideology — some idea powerful enough to consolidate the country around his rule" (Barry, 2012).

The development of a new idea went hand in hand with what a number of commentators described as an "unprecedented crackdown against civic activism" in Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2013). As Rachel Denber, Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia deputy director argued, "…[S]ince the so-called 'color revolutions,' the Russian authorities have been attempting to marginalize, demonize, and discredit opposition politicians, human rights activists, civil society organizations... This current encroachment by the authorities on all fronts seems to be especially fierce" (http://bit.ly/1dPel74). Additionally, that was the time when significant concerns were raised regarding the new restrictive amendments to the law on public rallies and the administrative code, the law on "foreign agents," and the law that re-criminalized defamation.

In September 2012, Putin held a meeting in Krasnodar, where he spoke about "the values and moral foundations" of Russia's future. Putin argued that "cultural self-awareness, spiritual and moral values, and value codes" were a highly contested area and, sometimes, "subject to overt informational hostility." Within that context, according to Putin, Russians had to build the "future on a strong foundation, and that foundation is patriotism."

In a month, Putin signed a decree that established a new agency to become part of the presidential administration - the Directorate for Social Projects. The main goal of the directorate was identified as strengthening the spiritual and moral foundations of Russian society and improving state policies in the area of patriotic education. The reaction to the initiative was mixed. For example, one Russian political scientist pointed out that with the help of that effort, the president sought to prioritize the ideology of patriotism: "The main reason for creating such an agency is that the energy of the society has to be used - to the largest degree possible – for the development of the country, in the interest of the country. The patriotic ideology will unite everyone around these goals of development."(V administracii presidenta sozdano upravlenie, 2012). A different view was expressed by the representatives of the opposition, who compared the new directorate with the Soviet-era Department for Agitation and Propaganda and considered the initiative as another effort to "tighten the screws" and curb political dissent in the country.

In his 2012 Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin announced that, "In patriotism, I see a consolidating basis for our politics" (Putin, 2012). The idea was enthusiastically supported by the "Putin's majority." For example, Irina Yarovaya, head of the State Duma Committee on Security and coordinator of United Russia's "patriotic platform," suggested that "the national idea of patriotism" ran like a red thread through the president's address: "A patriotism of action is our common national idea," – said Yarovaya (Vinokurova, 2012).

Since that time, different options have been offered to help stimulate patriotic feelings. For example, last year, young activists from St. Petersburg's City Commission on Patriotism suggested that every teenager should take an oath of allegiance before receiving the Russian passport. The initiative was supported by the Governor of St. Petersburg. The Governor of the Penza Region directed the regional administration to print pocket calendars with the text of the national anthem and organize rehearsals of the anthem.

Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma on energy Oleg Mikheev suggested to "legislatively protect patriotic feelings of the Russians from provocations and insults" aimed at the country.[2] In Mikheev's view, the abuse of patriotic feelings should be considered an act of extremism punishable by imprisonment for the term of five years. According to the deputy, an example of "an insult to patriotic feelings" may be the so-called "alternative views" on the history with some authors "reaching a point of saying, oh, what a pity that civilized Germans did not take over the wild Soviet Union!" (Podosenov, 2013).

Russia's patriotism is significantly tied to the Soviet Union's role in World War II, in the Russian discourse mostly referred to as the Great Patriotic War. For the majority of Russians, the

[2] Oleg Mikheev's bill was one of three bills introduced in November 2013, which, according to a number of commentators, including a Moscow-based SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, "constituted a threat to the freedom of speech in Russia." Two other bills, one submitted by the deputies from the United Russia and A Just Russia, and the other introduced by a deputy from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (*Liberalno Demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii*, LDPR), sought to consider any activity related to "separatist propaganda" as criminal, and to block websites that the government would consider as extremist.

Great Patriotic War is a memory of substantial sacrifice and heroism. On the political arena, however, it sometimes becomes a contentious issue within the context of discussions of particular events or decisions of the Soviet leadership. There has been an increasing number of cases, where the authorities took a harsh position against those expressing opinions seen by them as "unpatriotic." This is how Dozhd, the only independent private TV channel in Russia, has recently come to be denounced.

The Dozhd team was severely accused of disrespecting the memory of the war victims, when it published on the channel's website a poll question if the Soviet Union should have surrendered Leningrad in order to save hundreds of thousands human lives. For example, the speaker of the Upper House of the Russian parliament Valentina Matviyenko said that posing that question was "an act of blasphemy - another one in a series of attempts to falsify the results of World War II, rehabilitate those who had unleashed that war and who were responsible for millions of the victims." St. Petersburg legislature's deputies asked Russia's Prosecutor General Yury Chaika to conduct an investigation into the published material and take "appropriate measures," up to shutting down the channel. At the same time, Russia's largest cable operators canceled contracts with Dozhd.

In response to the accusations, Dozd broadcasted a TV marathon on the topic of patriotism arguing that the TV channel was against monopolization of the notion of patriotism: "We do not want [patriotism] to be confused with the notion of loyalty to the authorities. The more you love your country, the more concerned you are about it. The more questions you have" (tvrain.ru). As part of the discussions, Irina Prokhorova, head of the Civil Platform party, spoke about Russian authorities' attempts to monopolize the notion of patriotism: "there are people who have power and privileges, who better than others know what it means to love the Motherland, and we are told what it means … [and those who do not conform] become non-patriots and non-citizens." In a similar vein, Mikhail Fedotov, head of the Presidential Council on Civil Society and Human Rights, pointed out that there has been a widespread belief in Russia that critics of the regime are non-patriots, which is a myth that does not correspond to the reality.

A few months ago, the magazine *Kommersant Vlast* reported that within the past year, the Kremlin managed to do the following in an effort to advance patriotism: establish ties with the academic community, start the mechanisms to change the structure of the humanities textbooks, and organize several "landmark projects." Cinema and literature are going to be next (Surnacheva, 2013). In the meantime, a new strategy for patriotic education of the Russian citizens is being developed. Additionally, the Russian Ministry of Education and Science plans to develop a national strategy for development and education in the Russian Federation. Patriotism and tolerance are among the key elements of the proposed strategy. Accomplishing meaningful, positive change of any of these "elements," however, may become problematic given current national trends.

Intolerance to "Others"

As a number of studies suggest, the principal idea that currently consolidates different parts of Russian society is intolerance to "others." According to the results of a research project entitled "Russian Ideological Stagnation in the Mirror of Social Media," Russian society is currently

divided into four major political streams or groups, including liberal, leftwing, nationalist, and supporters of the ruling regime. The scholars, who worked on the project, found that xenophobia, which is often accompanied by calls for social justice, is the key idea shared by representatives of all four groups.

As previous studies show, the formation of a negative attitude towards the others is often not related to individual experiences, but rather to the pressure from above and/or the redirection of social tensions. For example, examining the nature of anti-Americanism in Russian society, Shlapentokh (2011) pointed out that the regime and the elite play a substantial role in advancing anti-American sentiments in Russia. Such an influence on society is exercised through various means, including the media, the system of education, and literature. The speed with which messages from the top can descend the vertical to reach their intended recipients can be surprisingly fast.

According to Lev Gudkov, director of the Levada Center, a respected Russian independent polling center, in the 2000s, Russian society faced a significant "deficit of development ideas" (Filina, 2013). With no changes occurring, the deficit was coupled with an increase in public discontent that became especially pronounced in late 2010 and the beginning of 2011. As Gudkov pointed out, societal tensions were redirected and targeted at "the routine forms of mass hatred for the enemy." The wide list of "others" has been continuously expanding. For example, the 2013 data from the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM) demonstrated that 63 percent of Russians supported the initiative to register NGOs that were involved in "political activity" and receive funding from abroad as "foreign agents." Similarly, according to the Levada Center, 50 percent of Russian citizens support the idea of holding lawmakers who fail to disclose information about their ownership of real estate in Russia or abroad criminally responsible.

In the words of Emil Pain (2013), "We treat others equally badly—those who come from overseas or a neighboring region" and "if we are friends, we are friends against somebody." According to the Rating of National Threats developed by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, the biggest threat that Russians are worried about is that Russia is being occupied by the representatives of other nationalities (35 percent). Another study conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation showed that two-thirds of Russians are cautious of migrants. Russians are worried about both legal and illegal migration. It was reported earlier that Moscow and St. Petersburg top the list of Russian cities with the highest number of incidents of xenophobia and ethnic intolerance. In areas other than Moscow and St. Petersburg, approximately 65 percent of respondents expressed their support for strict limitations to migration.

Migration was a key theme of all candidates in the recent Moscow mayoral campaign. Acting Mayor Sergei Sobyanin was quite specific about his position:

> Moscow is a Russian city and it should stay that way. Not Chinese, Tajik or Uzbek. . . . People who speak poor Russian and have a completely different culture are better off living in their own countries. Therefore, we do not welcome their adaptation into Moscow. I think that these are probably seasonal workers who must return to their

> families, their homes, and their countries after having worked here. (as quoted in Flintoff & Armitage, 2013)

At the end of July 2013, a series of events in Moscow's Matveevsky market led to the launching of a campaign to fight illegal migration. Human rights advocates called the situation "anti-migrant hysteria" and noted that the authorities were exercising a "cynical manipulation of public consciousness" for their own benefit. The campaign included police raids, the establishment of camps for illegal migrants, and the development of mobile apps to help detain offenders. Additionally, multiple official statements emphasizing the negative factors associated with migration were released. For example, new information emerged highlighting a significant number of crimes in which migrants were involved. According to Moscow police chief Anatoly Yakunin, in Moscow, in 2013, 50 percent of all crimes were committed by individuals coming from other areas. Out of that number, 22 percent of crimes occurred with the involvement of foreign nationals.

Despite seeming consolidation around negative attitudes toward the "others," there is practically no unification around some kind of shared positive principles and values. While patriotism is discussed as a unifying factor for Russia, previous studies do not show the increase in patriotic attitudes. For example, the Levada Center's data collected in October 2013, have documented that 69 percent of Russians consider themselves patriots. Compared with what was found in the early 2000s, this indicates an 8 percent decrease. At the same time, the number of individuals who do not consider themselves patriots increased from 16 to 19 percent. Commenting on this finding, Lev Gudkov suggested that the numbers do not demonstrate significant change. At the same time, one might argue that there was quite a bit of "state patriotism fatigue" in the society. Indeed, currently, 42 percent of Russians believe that the authorities' rhetoric about patriotism has intensified, while only 24 percent point out that patriotism among Russians has been increasing.

Russians Views of Patriotism

On February 21-25, 2014, upon the request of the Institute of Modern Russia (IMR), the Levada Center included six questions on the topic of patriotism in Russia in their monthly omnibus survey. The survey reported data on a representative sample of 1603 citizens of Russia from 130 settlements in 45 regions of the country, 18 years of age or over. The questions were developed by IMR analysts in collaboration with the Levada Center sociologists. The purpose of the questions was to identify the meanings that Russians attach to the notion of patriotism.

According to the survey data, Russians overall consider the essence of patriotism as "love to the country." This perception is at the core of the notion of patriotism for over 68 percent of respondents, which indicates a 9 percent increase from the last year and a 10 percent increase from 2000. According to approximately 27 percent of Russians, being a patriot involves work for the benefit of the country – an 8 percent decrease from 2000. Twenty-two percent of respondents reported that the patriot was to make efforts to change things for the better in order to ensure positive future in the country (Table 1).

Individuals with higher education emphasized the importance of these two aspects slightly more frequently than other respondents (31 percent and 24 percent). Young people aged 18-24 years were less likely to link patriotism with these dimensions of active behavior (19 percent and 18 percent, respectively). Students and young people in general mostly see the meaning of patriotism as love to the country (74 percent – students, 69 percent - young people aged 18-24 years).

Compared to the early 2000s, the period when the Russian government initiated efforts to increase patriotic sentiments, there has been limited change in Russians' perception of the meaning of patriotism (Table 1). Importantly, however, the number of Russians considering patriotism through the lens of active behavior decreased by 8 percent. The vast majority of respondents choose to limit the notion of patriotism to "love of the country." Over the same period of time, the number of respondents arguing that patriotism involves defending one's country against any accusations and criticism decreased by 6 percent, which may indicate that Russians have become somewhat more receptive to critical perspectives.

Table 1 What Does "Being a Patriot" Mean to You?

		2000	2007	**2014**
1.	Love your country	58	66	**68**
2.	Work/act for the benefit and prosperity of your country	35	27	**27**
3.	Strive to change current situation in your country to ensure a decent future for the nation	23	21	**22**
4.	Defend your country against any accusations and criticism	24	21	**18**
5.	Believe that your country is better than any other	17	18	**16**
6.	Tell the truth about your country regardless of how bitter it could be	12	10	**11**
7.	Believe that your country does not have shortcomings	4	4	**5**
8.	No answer/difficult to answer	10	6	**4**

As demonstrated in the previous sections of this paper, Russian policy-makers have chosen and pushed for a top-down approach to strengthening patriotism in Russian society. For example, at the initial stages of the effort, it was declared that it was the state that would manage the system of patriotic education. The recent events in the country – some of which have been highlighted in the paper – show that in an increasing number of cases, the authorities sought to monopolize the notion of patriotism and, consequently, determine what constitutes a "true patriotism."

Interestingly enough, however, the vast majority of Russians hold an entirely different view of this matter. Almost 84 percent of Russians believe that patriotism is "a deeply personal feeling" that cannot be commanded from the top (Table 2). The state's directive role is clearly questioned: only 9 percent of respondents believe that the power of definition is in the hands of the state. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the survey data show that the respondents in the age group of 55 years and over as well as retired individuals give preference to the top-down direction slightly more often than other respondents.

Table 2 What Point of View Do You Prefer?

			Age				Selected Occupations				
		Total	18-24	25-39	40-54	**55 and over**	entrepreneur	specialist	student	**retired**	unemployed
1.	Patriotism is a deeply personal feeling – a person decides for him-/herself what is patriotic and what is not	**83.8**	86.2	82.4	87.5	**80.8**	88	86.8	83.6	**76.5**	81.3
2.	The state has to define what is patriotic and what is not	**8.9**	7.4	8.1	6.9	**12**	1.5	8.4	11.9	**14.2**	1.4
3.	Difficult to answer	**7.3**	6.5	9.4	5.6	**7.2**	10.5	4.8	4.5	**9.3**	17.3

In the view of Russians, patriotism does not necessarily mean support of the authorities: 65.3 percent of the respondents mostly or fully disagreed with the statement that a patriot must support the authorities in power. Some 23 percent of Russians either fully or mostly agreed with the statement (Table 3A). Furthermore, despite the existing myth that critics of those in power are "unpatriotic," almost 82 percent of Russians perceive this issue from quite an opposite view (Table 3B).

Table 3A Do You Agree with an Opinion: "Patriot Must Support the Authorities in Power under Any Circumstances"?

1.	Fully agree	4
2.	Mostly agree	19.3
3.	Mostly disagree	41
4.	Fully disagree	24.3
5.	Difficult to answer	11.5

Table 3B What Point of View Do You Prefer?

1.	One who criticizes the authorities, cannot be considered a patriot	10.5
2.	One can criticize the authorities and be a patriot	81.6
5.	Difficult to answer	7.9

Patriotism is often understood through the lens of pride for the country. The survey found that Russians are mostly proud of Russia's rich natural resources (38.5 percent), history (37.8 percent), sports achievements (28.9 percent); culture (28.5 percent), and size of the country (28 percent) (Table 4). As the survey showed, a very small percentage of Russians are proud of the

country's social and economic achievements: only 2 percent of respondents said they were proud of Russian healthcare system, 5.2 percent indicated they were proud of the system of education, while 5.4 percent of Russians are proud of the nation's economic achievements.

Another indicator that shows a disturbing trend in Russian society is that only 7.9 percent of Russians are proud of their fellow citizens. As previous research shows, feelings of national pride are "fundamentally tied to one's views toward those around …" (Amoedo, 2013). The finding from the survey is in line with ones surfaced in a number of other studies that have shown a low level of trust in fellow citizens in Russia. For example, according to the Center for Extremism and Xenophobia of the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences estimates, Russians' level of trust for people closest to them is one of the lowest in Europe. As Amoedo (2013) referring to Smith and Jarkko (1998) pointed out, "If an individual does not trust those around … it is less likely that she will express positive feelings toward the country as a whole" (p. 3).

Table 4 What Makes You Proud of Your Country?

1.	Rich natural resources	38.5
2.	Russian history	37.8
3.	Sports achievements	28.9
4.	Russian culture	28.5
5.	Size of the country	28
6.	Russia's position on the international arena	23.6
7.	Military forces	14.3
8.	Modern achievements in science	13.6
9.	Fellow citizens	7.9
10.	Economic achievements	5.4
11.	Russian system of education	5.2
12.	Healthcare system	2
13.	None of the above	6.5
14.	Difficult to answer	5.7

Within this context, the survey also showed a high level of intolerance to the "outsiders," including representatives of other nationalities. In a significant number of cases, Russian patriotism goes along with a negative attitude towards the "others." In the opinion of one-third of the respondents, persons of "non-Russian nationalities" are guilty of causing many of the misfortunes of Russia (Table 5). Similarly, when asked about a more appropriate government's policy toward migrants, 73 percent of the respondents suggested that the government "should try to restrict the influx of migrants." Compared with the early 2000s, this data show a very sharp increase of 28 percent (Table 6).[3]

[3] The situation has slightly improved if compared with the last year's record of 78 percent of Russians supporting the restrictive measures against migrants. It should be noted, however, that the 2013 data was collected by the Levada Center after anti-migrant riots.

Table 5 To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree With the Following Statement: "Persons of 'Non-Russian' Nationalities" Are "Guilty of Causing Many of the Misfortunes of Russia"?

1.	Fully agree	8.3
2.	Mostly agree	25.7
3.	Mostly disagree	35.9
4.	Fully disagree	17.7
5.	Difficult to answer	12.4

Table 6 What Should the Russian Government's Policy toward Migrants Be?

	2002	2005	2008	2011	**2014**	(2013)
Should try to restrict the influx of migrants	45	59	52	64	**73**	(78)
Should not have any administrative barriers against the influx, but rather try to use it for the benefit of the country	44	36	35	28	**19**	(14)
Difficult to answer	11	6	13	8	**8**	(8)

Conclusions

This study demonstrated that the concept of patriotism has acquired various meanings in the Russian context. The general overview of the Russian government's efforts and the results of the survey of attitudes of Russian people show that two opposite views of patriotism have been constructed: patriotism as an ideology and patriotism as a natural and personal feeling. Within this context, the differences in understanding are manifested in ways Russian authorities and citizens answer the question of who determines what is patriotic and what is not. While the state introduces and pushes forward with the top-down patriotic initiatives in an effort to achieve particular goals, the majority of Russian people believe it is not the state that has to decide what is patriotic and what is not. Patriotism is a deep and intimate feeling that cannot be commanded or directed from the top. Additionally, despite the official preference for the "uncritical conformity" to the ideals of the state patriotism, a significant number of Russians do not dismiss criticism as unpatriotic.

The majority of Russians associate patriotism with a love to the country, but their willingness to work for the betterment of the country is limited. It appears that the view of patriotism as an active identification with the nation has become less prevalent in the country. People in Russia have the highest amount of pride in Russia's rich natural resources, history, sports achievements, culture, and the size of the country, while remain quite skeptical about social and economic advances. A very insignificant number of people take pride in fellow citizens.

Finally, Russian patriotism has acquired some of the "negative features of nationalism" and adopted a defensive position toward the "others," including representatives of other nationalities. The figures from the survey, which reinforce previous findings, are troubling and, like a number of other studies, highlight the problem of intolerance and xenophobia in the country. The

question of whether it is possible to be "pro-us" without being "anti-them" has been answered largely negatively in today's Russia. This argument again brings into the focus the very notion of "true patriotism," which rejects national hostility or intolerance.

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